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Abstract
Using China Customs data that cover monthly transactions of all
Chinese exporters, we investigate how Chinese exporters respond to
U.S. antidumping investigations during the 2000-2006 period. Our
di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis uncovers a number of ndings: (1)
the substantial trade-dampening e¤ect at the product level operates
mostly at the extensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the number of ex-
porters) rather than the intensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the ex-
port volume per exporter); (2) direct exporters are more likely to exit
the U.S. market than trade intermediaries upon both the a¢ rmative
preliminary and nal ITC determinations; (3) multi-product direct
exporters are more likely to exit the U.S. market than single-product
direct exporters upon the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determination,
but the opposite holds upon the a¢ rmative nal ITC determination;
and (4) little price adjustment to antidumping investigations are found
at either the product level or rm-product level. We then provide a
coherent explanation to the aforementioned ndings based on recent
developments in trade theories.
Keywords: Antidumping investigations; Di¤erence-in-di¤erences es-
timation; Extensive and intensive margins; Trade intermediaries; Single-
versus multi-product exporters
JEL Codes: F13; D22; F14; L25
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1 Introduction
Despite of the increasing trend for international trade due to rounds of reduc-
tion in tari¤s and advancement in telecommunications and logistics, we have
witnessed persistent and even increasing use of contingent trade protection
policies (e.g., Prusa, 2001; Zanardi, 2006; Bown, 2011). In particular, govern-
ments around the world have resorted to antidumping measures, which are
permissible under the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and regula-
tions, to protect their rms and industries. The widespread use of antidump-
ing measures has intrigued economists to study its consequences. While the
existing research generally focuses on the impact of antidumping measures
on protected rms and industries,1 it is also interesting to understand the
corresponding impact on a¤ected foreign exporters.2 Moreover, in light of
the burgeoning literature on rm heterogeneity and trade, it is important to
investigate how di¤erent exporters may respond to antidumping measures.
This paper makes the following contributions to the literature.3 First,
on top of presenting evidence for the trade-dampening e¤ect of antidump-
ing investigations at product level, we anatomize how the trade-dampening
e¤ect operates, specically, whether it is through the decrease in the num-
ber of exporters (i.e., extensive margin) or in the trade volume per exporter
(i.e., intensive margin). Second, we investigate how di¤erent exporters may
respond to antidumping investigations, specically, the possible di¤erence
between direct exporters and trade intermediaries, and that between single-
product direct exporters and multi-products direct exporters. Third, in addi-
tion to examining the impact of antidumping investigations on trade volume,
we study whether exporters adjust export prices of the concerned products.
Fourth, aside from looking at the e¤ect of antidumping investigations at the
point of nal imposition of duties, we also examine its e¤ects at other impor-
tant stages of the antidumping investigation process, such as initiation and
preliminary decisions.
Specically, our research utilizes the antidumping cases imposed by the
United States (the U.S.) against Chinese exporters over the 2000-2006 period.
The choice of this research setting is motivated by the fact that China has be-
come the worlds largest recipient of antidumping measures along with its rise
1For recent studies, see, for example, Gallaway, Blonigen and Flynn (1999), Konings
and Vandenbussche (2008), and Pierce (2011).
2There are a few papers looking at how antidumping duties a¤ect foreign exporters
pricing behavior (Blonigen and Park, 2004), export-destination diversication (Bown and
Crowley, 2006, 2007), and FDI strategies for serving foreign markets (Blonigen, 2002).
3For surveys of existing studies on antidumping, see, Blonigen and Prusa (2003) and
Falvey and Nelson (2006).
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from an insignicant player in the world trade system in 1978 to the worlds
largest exporter. Meanwhile, the U.S. is the worlds second largest initiator
of antidumping cases against China, because of its rising trade decit with
China and the apparently related losses of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. To
carry out the empirical investigation, we draw data from two courses: China
Customs data (2000-2006) and theWorld Bank global antidumping database.
From the rst data set, we obtain information of monthly export transac-
tions at the Chinese HS-8 digit product category by all Chinese exporters to
the U.S., including export volume, export value and exporter identity. From
the second data set, we compile all the antidumping investigations carried
out by the U.S. against Chinese exporters at the U.S. HS-10 digit product
category over the 2000-2006 period, including information such as initiation
date, preliminary determination dates, and nal determination dates. The
two data sets are then combined at the HS-6 digit product category, which
is common to both China and the U.S.
Our identication strategy relies on the comparison of outcome variables
(such as export volume and export price) of exporters in the a¤ected product
category (the treatment group) with those in the una¤ected product cate-
gory (the control group) before and after the various important stages of the
antidumping investigation process, i.e., the di¤erence-in-di¤erences method.
Specically, we use two alternative control groups: rst, for a HS-6 digit
product that is subject to antidumping investigations, we use as the con-
trol group all other una¤ected HS-6 digit products within the same HS-4
digit category. Second, we follow Blonigen and Park (2004) in constructing
a matched control group based on the likelihood of products being subject
to antidumping investigations.
Our main ndings are summarized as follows. (1) We nd substantial
trade-dampening e¤ects of antidumping investigations at HS-6 digit prod-
uct level at both the date of a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determination and
the date of a¢ rmative nal ITC determination. Specically, the a¢ rma-
tive preliminary ITC determination causes the growth of trade volume for
the treatment group to lag behind that for the control group by around
32% during the period between the preliminary and nal ITC determina-
tions. The a¢ rmative nal ITC determination causes the growth of trade
volume for the treatment group to further lag behind that for the control
group by 65  66% after the nal ITC determination and until the end of
our sample period. (2) We show that the trade-dampening e¤ect operates
mostly at the extensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the number of exporters)
rather than the intensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the export volume per
exporter). Specically, the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determination causes
the growth of the number of exporters for the treatment group to lag behind
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that for the control group by around 16% during the period between the
preliminary and nal ITC determinations. And the a¢ rmative nal ITC
determination causes the growth of the number of exporters for the treat-
ment group to further lag behind that for the control group by 17%  18%
after the nal ITC determination and until the end of our sample period.
(3) In response to antidumping investigations, direct exporters are found to
be more likely to exit the U.S. market than trade intermediaries upon both
the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determination and the a¢ rmative nal ITC
determination. Meanwhile, we nd that multi-product direct exporters are
more likely to exit the U.S. market than single-product direct exporters upon
the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determination, but the opposite holds upon
the a¢ rmative nal ITC determination. (4) We nd little Freight On Board
(F.O.B.) export price adjustment to antidumping investigations at both the
product and rm-product level.
To understand the aforementioned empirical ndings, we draw insights
from the recent developments in rm heterogeneity and trade. As the F.O.B.
export prices are found to barely change, the nal sales prices in the U.S.
are expected to increase following the imposition of antidumping duties (un-
less the U.S. importers or retailers completely absorb these antidumping
duties, which is an unlikely scenario). The increase in the nal sales prices
in the U.S. subsequently leads to a decline in the demand of the concerned
products, which explains the observed substantial trade-dampening e¤ects of
antidumping investigations at the product level.
At the status quo, the shrinking market demand would lead to a de-
crease in rm revenue across the board, which then causes some exporters
to incur losses in the and consequently exit the U.S. market. For example,
in the framework of constant markups and xed costs of exporting (e.g.,
Melitz, 2003), some less productive exporters may nd their revenues not
large enough to cover the xed costs of exporting. In a framework of variable
markups (e.g., Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008), the decrease in rm revenue
leads to a fall in rm markups, as a result of which some less productive ex-
porters may nd their revenue not large enough to cover the variable costs.
Under the new equilibrium, however, it is possible that the surviving (and the
more productive) exporters could maintain their export volume by absorbing
some of the market share left by the exiting exporters.
The observed di¤erence in the exit likelihood between trade intermedi-
aries and direct exporters can be explained by a model of exporting behavior
in the presence of trade intermediaries (e.g., Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei,
2011; Lu, Lu, and Tao, 2011). Specically, the more productive manufactur-
ers choose to export directly by themselves (these manufacturers are referred
to as direct exporters), whereas the less productive manufacturers choose to
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export through trade intermediaries (these manufacturers are referred to as
indirect exporters). The decrease in rm revenue due to antidumping in-
vestigations causes some (less productive) direct exporters switch to export
through trade intermediaries and makes some (less productive) indirect ex-
porters exit the U.S. market. As a result, the e¤ect on trade intermediaries
is muted as they lose some old clients but also gain some new ones.
The observed di¤erences in the exit likelihood between single-product di-
rect exporters and multi-product direct exporters can be explained by the
resource reallocation among di¤erent products within the multi-product pro-
ducers (e.g., Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano, 2011). Specically, the negative
shocks created by the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determination may cast
greater impacts on multi-product direct exporters than their single-product
counterparts, as many multi-product direct exporters can reallocate resources
from the a¤ected products to their other, una¤ected (especially core) prod-
ucts. This leads to more decrease in revenues generated from the a¤ected
product category for multi-product direct exporters than their ex ante equally
protable single-product counterparts, consequently leading to more exit of
the former than the latter. However, when the second wave of negative
shocks caused by the a¢ rmative nal ITC determination hits, the remaining
multi-product direct exporters are those with limited room for resource real-
location (e.g., the a¤ected products are their core products). As a result, the
negative shocks are expected to cast similar impacts on both single-product
and multi-product direct exporters. However, as the productivity threshold
of direct exporting for the remaining multi-product direct exporters is lower
than that of single-product direct exporters (due to some scope economies
enjoyed by the former), negative shocks of the similar magnitude cause a dis-
proportionally more exit of the latter than the former from the U.S. market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
institutional background of antidumping investigations in the U.S. The esti-
mation strategy is discussed in Section 3, and data is reported in Section 4.
Empirical results and then a theoretical explanation are presented in Section
5. The paper concludes with Section 6.
2 Institutional Background of Antidumping
Investigations in the U.S.
In this section, we briey describe the institutional context of antidumping
investigations in the U.S. and its relevance to our identication strategy
(Staiger and Wolak, 1994).
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In the U.S., there are two government bodies involved in the antidumping
investigations, the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the International
Trade Commission (ITC). The DOC determines whether an imported prod-
uct under investigation is sold in the U.S. at less than its fair value, while
the ITC determines whether the imported product has materially injured
the relevant U.S. domestic industries. Each of these two bodies makes two
determinations, i.e., the preliminary and nal determinations.
Once an antidumping petition against an imported product is led and
considered in order, the ITC rst makes a preliminary determination within
45 days. If the determination is negative, the investigation is terminated.
Otherwise (i.e., a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determination), the DOC con-
ducts its investigation and makes a preliminary determination in the next
115 days. Regardless of the DOCs preliminary determination (a¢ rmative
or negative), the investigation process continues. However, if the DOCs pre-
liminary determination is a¢ rmative, the importers of the a¤ected imported
product have to post a cash deposit or bond to cover the dumping duties
payable estimated by the DOC.
After the DOCs preliminary determination but before the ITCs nal
determination, the antidumping investigation can be terminated due to the
withdrawal by the petitioners or suspended due to the agreements reached
between the a¤ected foreign exporters and the DOC. If an antidumping in-
vestigation is neither terminated nor suspended, the investigation moves on
to the next stage, in which the DOC makes a nal determination within 75
days of its preliminary decision. If the DOCs nal determination is nega-
tive, the investigation is terminated. Otherwise, the ITC has 45 (or 75) days
to conduct a second round of investigation and make a nal determination,
depending on whether the DOCs preliminary determination is a¢ rmative
(or negative). Once both the DOC and the ITC reach a¢ rmative nal deter-
minations, the DOC must issue an antidumping order to levy antidumping
duties within 7 days.
In summary, there are ve important date points during an antidumping
investigation, the initiation, the preliminary ITC determination, the prelim-
inary DOC determination, the nal DOC determination, and the nal ITC
determination.
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3 Estimation Strategy
3.1 Estimation Specication
Our monthly export transaction data, in contrast to the yearly data used in
most of the existing literature, allow us to investigate if there are di¤eren-
tial exportersresponses to di¤erent stages of the antidumping investigation
process. As noted in the Section 2, there are ve stages in an antidumping
investigation: initiation of the case, preliminary ITC determination, prelim-
inary DOC determination, nal DOC determination, and nal ITC deter-
mination. Given that the DOC makes a¢ rmative determinations in most
of the antidumping petitions, we focus on the remaining three dates in the
antidumping investigation, i.e., the initiation date, preliminary ITC determi-
nation, and nal ITC determination. The a¢ rmative nal ITC determination
leads to an imposition of dumping duties, which consequently increases the
costs for the U.S. importers of the concerned export products. The a¢ rma-
tive preliminary ITC determination, in combination with (almost certain)
a¢ rmative preliminary DOC determination, would make it a requirement
for the U.S. importers to pay a deposit as a bond for the expected dumping
duties. Even the initiation of the antidumping investigation might have an
e¤ect on U.S. importers, as it brings uncertainty to their businesses. We
therefore expect progressively negative responses of exporters to the three
stages of the antidumping investigation (initiation, preliminary ITC deter-
mination, and nal ITC determination).
To identify the possible e¤ects of antidumping investigations, we employ
the di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) estimation strategy at both the product
level (dened at HS-6 digit) and the rm-product level. Specically, we
exploit two sources of variations, time variation (before and after a criti-
cal date point of the antidumping investigation process) and cross-sectional
variation (a¤ected products/rms or the treatment group, and una¤ected
products/rms or the control group). The identication relies on the com-
parison of the outcome variables of the treatment group with those of the
control group both before and after the relevant stages of the antidumping
investigation process.
The estimation specication at the product-level takes the following form
ypt = 1Treatmentp  Post1pt + 2Treatmentp  Post2pt
+3Treatmentp  Post3pt + p + t + "pt; (1)
where ypt is the outcome variable (i.e., the logarithm of export volume, the
logarithm of the number of exporters, and the logarithm of export price)
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for product p in month t; Treatmentp is a dummy variable, taking value
of 1 if product p belongs to the treatment group (i.e., being investigated
for dumping) and 0 otherwise; p is the product dummy, capturing all time-
invariant product characteristics; t is the month dummy, capturing common
e¤ects to all products in the same month; and "pt is an error term. The three
time variables corresponding to the three date points of the antidumping
investigation process are constructed as follows,
Post1pt =

1 if t 2 [tp0; tp1)
0 otherwise
; (2)
Post2pt =

1 if t 2 [tp1; tp2)
0 otherwise
; (3)
and
Post3pt =

1 if t  tp2
0 otherwise
; (4)
where tp0 is the date of the initiation (specically, the month in which the
case is initiated) for product p; tp1 is the date of the preliminary ITC deter-
mination for product p; and tp2 is the date of the nal ITC determination
for product p. The coe¢ cients of interest in this study are: 1, 2 and
3. To deal with the potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we
cluster the standard errors at the product-level (see Bertrand, Duo, and
Mullainathan, 2004).
The estimation specication for the rm-product level analysis is similar
to equation (1), with the only change being the replacement of the outcome
variable ypt at the product level by those at the rm-product level.
3.2 Estimation Issues
Before proceeding to the next section on data, we discuss a few estimation
issues in this sub-section.
First, we construct two alternative sets of control groups. The rst set of
control group encompasses all una¤ected products/rms within the same HS-
4 digit product category where the a¤ected products/rms belong to (referred
to as Control Group 1 ). The second set of control group is a matched group
(referred to as Control Group 2 ), constructed using the method of Blonigen
and Park (2004). Specically, we rst estimate the probability of a product
being charged with antidumping duties (see Table A.1 of the Appendix for the
logit regression results). The variables that are used to predict the probability
of being investigated for dumping include the import value of the product,
real GDP growth rate in the U.S., exchange rate index, a dummy variable
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indicating whether the product was previously charged with antidumping
duties, and HS 4-digit product dummy, similar to those used by Blonigen and
Park (2004). The matched control group are those una¤ected products that
have predicted probabilities at least equal to 75th percentile of the predicted
probability of the treatment group (see also Konings and Vandenbussche,
2008; Pierce, 2011).
Second, the consistent estimation of f1; 2; 3g hinges upon the assump-
tion that the di¤erence in the error term of the pre- and post-antidumping
investigation period for the treatment group is the same as the corresponding
one for the control group, i.e.,
E [4"ptjTreatmentp = 1] = E [4"ptjTreatmentp = 0] : (5)
With a panel data of multiple periods and multiple groups, we conduct
two validity checks following Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Imbens and
Wooldridge (2009). Firstly, to explicitly check whether there is any dif-
ference in time trends between the treatment and control groups before
the initiation of antidumping investigation, we add an additional regressor,
Treatmentp  Prept, where
Prept =

1 if t 2 [tp0   12; tp0)
0 otherwise
; (6)
and the corresponding regression equation becomes
ypt = 0Treatmentp  Prept + 1Treatmentp  Post1pt
+2Treatmentp  Post2pt + 3Treatmentp  Post3pt
+p + t + "pt: (7)
Any statistical signicance of 0 would indicate di¤erences in time trends
between the treatment and control groups before the initiation of the an-
tidumping investigation, thereby invalidating the DID estimation.
Secondly, to allow for the possibility that di¤erent HS-6 digit products
may have di¤erent time trends, we further include product-specic linear
time trends and estimate the following equation
ypt = 1Treatmentp  Post1pt + 2Treatmentp  Post2pt
+3Treatmentp  Post3pt + p + p  t+ t + "pt: (8)
A valid DID estimation requires that f1; 2; 3g remain robust to the in-
clusion of product-specic time trend (p  t).
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4 Data
Our study draws on data from two sources. The rst is China Customs Data
for the 2000-2006 period. This data set cover monthly import or export trans-
action of every Chinese exporter or importer, including specically product
information (classied at the Chinese HS-8 digit level), trade volume, trade
value, identity of Chinese exporters or importers, and export destination or
importing countries. As our analysis focuses on the antidumping cases by the
U.S. against Chinese exporters, we extract information about the monthly
export transactions by Chinese exporters to the U.S.
The second data source is the Global Antidumping Database (GAD) from
the World Bank, covering all antidumping cases from 1980 to 2010 in the
world. The GAD has detailed information on each antidumping case, such
as product information (classied at the U.S. HS-10 digit level), initiation
date, preliminary determination dates, and nal determination dates. For
our analysis, we collect all U.S. antidumping cases against China during our
sample period (i.e., 2000-2006). There are a total of 47 cases. Two cases (one
in early 2000 and the other in late 2006) are dropped as there is not enough
pre- or post-antidumping period for us to carry out DID estimation. Next,
three cases are dropped because they overlapped with earlier antidumping
cases in the same HS-6 product categories (see also Konings and Vandenbuss-
che, 2008). 28 cases out of the remaining 42 cases ended up with a¢ rmative
nal ITC determination (referred to as successful cases); 5 out of the 6 cases
that had a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determination received negative nal
ITC determination (referred to as unsuccessful cases) and 1 was withdrawn
before the nal ITC determination (referred to as withdrawn cases); and,
nally, 8 cases were either withdrawn before the preliminary ITC determi-
nation or given the negative preliminary ITC determination (referred to as
terminated cases). As our analysis looks into the e¤ects of antidumping at
the three di¤erent stages of the antidumping investigation (i.e., initiation,
preliminary ITC determination, and nal ITC determination), we focus on
a sample of 28 successful cases in the main analysis. For a robustness check,
we include the unsuccessful and withdrawn cases, and nd our results re-
main qualitatively the same.4 See Table A.2 of the Appendix for a list of
all the U.S. antidumping cases against Chinese exporters over the period of
4We also experiment with other possible robustness checks involving the change in the
sample of cases, such as combining the 28 successful cases with the only withdrawn case
(as the withdrawn cases are generally cases that would end up with a¢ rmative nal ITC
determination) and combining the 28 successful cases with the 5 unsuccessful cases (as they
all have date points for preliminary and nal ITC determinations), and nd qualitatively
similar results (available upon request).
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2000-2006.
We match the two data sets (i.e., China customs data and the GAD)
at the HS-6 digit level, the most disaggregated level at which the two data
are comparable. The matched panel data from 2000 to 2006 contain 16,302
product-month level observations and 800,079 rm-product-month level ob-
servations. And among the 346 HS-6 digit product categories contained in
the matched data, 81 product categories are successfully charged with an-
tidumping duties.5
One of the focuses of this paper is to investigate the possible heteroge-
neous response to antidumping investigations in light of the recent literature
on rm heterogeneity and trade. We rst follow the method developed by
Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) for the same data to divide rms of our
sample into trade intermediaries and direct exporters. Specically, trade in-
termediaries are identied as those rms whose names contain Chinese char-
acters with the English-equivalent meaning of importer, exporter, and/or
trading. Furthermore, we divide the sample of direct exporters into two
types, single-product rms and multi-product rms. Specically, a rm is
identied as a multi-product rm if it exports more than one HS-6 digit prod-
ucts before the initiation of antidumping investigations. For those products
that were subject to antidumping investigations during our sample period,
there were 9,356 exporters before the initiation of the antidumping investiga-
tions. 3,465 of them were trade intermediaries. Among the remaining 5,891
direct exporters, 627 rms were single-product direct exporters.
As the monthly data is quite noisy, we conduct a robustness check with
the quarterly instead of monthly data. Meanwhile, to further alleviate the
concerns of outlying observations, we experiment with excluding the top and
bottom 1% of the data. Furthermore, as other countries across the world
may conduct antidumping investigations of the same products as does the
U.S. in the same period, this may confound our results. To alleviate this
concern, we experiment with excluding those cases (i.e., all together 4 cases)
that were also under antidumping investigations in some other countries.
5 Empirical Findings
In this section, we rst provide our four, baseline empirical ndings regard-
ing how exporters respond to antidumping investigations in Section 5.1-5.4.
Then we present a series of robustness checks on the validity of our DID
estimation and other econometric concerns in Section 5.5. Finally, drawing
5Note that one antidumping case may involve several HS-6 digit product categories.
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recent developments in trade theories, we provide a coherent explanation for
our empirical ndings in Section 5.6.
5.1 Product-level Quantity Response
We begin by examining the possible trade-dampening e¤ect of antidumping
investigations at product level. Before presenting regression results regarding
equation (1), we plot time trends of export volume for the treatment and
control groups over the pre- and post-antidumping investigation periods in
Figures 1a-1d. The upper panel reports the results obtained using Control
Group 1 (i.e., all una¤ected HS-6 digit products within the same HS-4 digit
product category where the a¤ected product belongs to), while the lower
panel reports the results obtained using Control Group 2 (i.e., the matched
control group following Blonigen and Park, 2004). The left panel reports
time trends of export volume separately for the treatment group and the
respective control group, while the right panel reports the time trend of the
di¤erence in export volume between the treatment group and the respective
control group. In each gure, there are three vertical dotted dash lines, from
the left to the right, marking respectively the date points of the initiation of
the antidumping investigation, the preliminary ITC determination, and the
nal ITC determination.
A few results emerge from these gures. First, there is clearly an upward
trend in export volume of both the treatment and control groups before the
initiation of the antidumping investigation, consistent with the general trend
of increasing Chinese exports to the U.S. in the past decades. Second, more
importantly, before the initiation of the antidumping investigation, the treat-
ment and control groups do not exhibit any di¤erential time trends, implying
that there is no selection on the outcome variable and hence the validity of
our DID estimation. Third, there is a clear dampening e¤ect of antidump-
ing investigations on export volume of the treatment group, consistent with
the ndings in the literature (e.g., Prusa, 2001; Egger and Nelson, 2011).
Fourth, regarding the e¤ects of the three di¤erent stages of the antidumping
investigations, we observe signicant e¤ects of both the a¢ rmative prelimi-
nary and a¢ rmative nal ITC determinations but not the initiation of the
investigation (see also Staiger and Wolak, 1994).
Regression results corresponding to equation (1) are reported in Table
1, where Control Group 1 and Control Group 2 are used respectively in
Column 1 and Column 2. It is found that both 2 and 3 are negative and
statistically signicant at 1% level, while 1 is negative albeit statistically
insignicant, which are consistent with the ndings revealed in Figures 1a-
1d. The marginal impact of the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determination
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can be calculated as ^2  ^1 =  0:322 (from Column 1) or  0:315 (from
Column 2), both signicant at 1% level. Meanwhile, the marginal impact
of the a¢ rmative nal ITC determination can be calculated as ^3  ^2 =
 0:651 (from Column 1) or  0:665 (from Column 2), both signicant at
1% level. In terms of economic magnitude, the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC
determination causes the growth of export volume for the treatment group
to lag behind that for the control group by around 32% during the period
between the preliminary and nal ITC determinations. The a¢ rmative nal
ITC determination causes the growth of export volume for the treatment
group to further lag behind that for the control group by 65  67% after the
nal ITC determination and until the end of our sample period.6
5.2 Extensive versus Intensive Margins
Now that we have documented a substantial dampening e¤ect of the an-
tidumping investigations on export volume, we next anatomize this e¤ect by
investigating its underlying mechanism. Specically, we look at the e¤ect of
antidumping investigations on both the number of exporters to the U.S. (ex-
tensive margin e¤ect) and the export volume per exporter (intensive margin
e¤ect).
Figures 2a-2d plot time trends of the number of exporters for the treat-
ment and control groups over the pre- and post-antidumping investigation
periods. Clearly, there is a signicant decrease in the number of exporters
caused by the antidumping investigations. Specically, after the initiation
but before the preliminary ITC determination, there is barely any change in
the number of exporters. However, after the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC de-
termination, the number of exporters decreases sharply, followed by another
substantial decrease upon the a¢ rmative nal ITC determination.
Figures 3a-3d present time trends of export volume per exporter for the
treatment and control groups over the pre- and post-antidumping investi-
gation periods. Similar to the results on the extensive margin, there is a
decrease in the export volume per exporter upon the a¢ rmative preliminary
ITC determination, followed by another decrease upon the a¢ rmative nal
ITC determination.
Note that in the above analysis on the extensive margin e¤ect we di-
vide the total export volume by the total number of exporters. That is, for
the pre-investigation period, we include those exporters that eventually ex-
ited from the US market due to the antidumping investigations, and for the
6Prusa (2001) show that, on average, antidumping duties cause the value of imports to
fall by 30-50%, while the study of Egger and Nelson (2011) nds a modest impact using
structural estimation of the gravity model.
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post-investigation period we include those new entrants into the US export
market. As a result the aforementioned intensive margin results (Figures
3a-3d) could be compounded by the exit and entry of exporters. To address
this possible concern, we carry out anaother intensive margin e¤ect analy-
sis, i.e., for those surviving exporters. Figures 4a-4d present time trends of
export volume of surviving exporters and their control groups over the pre-
and post-antidumping investigation periods. Interestingly, in contrast to the
aforementioned intensive margin results for all exporters, there is no clear
di¤erential time trend between export volume of surviving exporters and
their control groups both before and after the antidumping investigation. In
other words, we do not nd evidence for the intensive-margin e¤ect, and the
patterns shown in Figures 3a-3d are mainly caused by the entry and exit of
exporters.
Regression results regarding the e¤ects of antidumping investigations on
the number of exporters and export volume per exporter (i.e., for all exporters
and for surviving exporters, separately) are reported in Table 2. Columns
1-2 report the e¤ects on the number of exporters of the antidumping inves-
tigations for the two respective control groups. It is found that both 2 and
3 are negative and statistically signicant at 1% level, while 1 is negative
albeit statistically insignicant. These results are consistent with the nd-
ings revealed in Figures 2a-2d, implying a strong extensive margin e¤ect of
the antidumping investigations. In terms of economic magnitude, the a¢ r-
mative preliminary ITC determination causes the growth of the number of
exporters for the treatment group to lag behind that for the control group
by around 16% during the period between the preliminary and nal ITC de-
terminations (i.e., ^2  ^1 '  0:16 with statistical signicance at 1% level).
And the a¢ rmative nal ITC determination causes the growth of the num-
ber of exporters for the treatment group to further lag behind that for the
control group by 17%  18% after the nal ITC determination and until the
end of our sample period (i.e., ^3  ^2 =  0:174   0:182 with statistical
signicance at 1% level).
Columns 3-4 of Table 2 present the results on the export volume per
exporter for all exporters of the antidumping investigations for the two re-
spective control groups. It is found that both 2 and 3 are negative and
statistically signicant at 1% level, consistent with the ndings revealed in
Figures 3a-3d. Columns 5-6 of Table 2 present the results on the export
volume per exporter for the surviving exporters of the antidumping investi-
gations for the two respective control groups. Clearly, none of 1, 2 and 3
has any statistical insignicance at 5% level. Taken together, much of the
intensive-margin e¤ect shown in Columns 3-4 of Table 2 are due to the the
entry and exit of exporters, and overall there is no evidence for the intensive-
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margin e¤ect.
5.3 Heterogeneous Responses
In the previous section, we document a strong extensive margin e¤ect of the
antidumping investigations, that is, the number of exporters fall sharply after
both the a¢ rmative preliminary and a¢ rmative nal ITC determinations.
It is curious to know what types of exporters are relatively more likely to
exit the export market at these two important dates of the antidumping
investigation process. To this end, we follow the recent literature on rm
heterogeneity in rst looking at the di¤erence between trade intermediaries
and direct exporters, and then at the di¤erence between single-product and
multi-product direct exporters.
Table 3 reports the regression results regarding the di¤erential likelihood
to exit the U.S. market between trade intermediaries and direct exporters,
with Columns 1-3 focusing on the exit upon the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC
determination and Columns 4-6 focusing on the exit upon the a¢ rmative nal
ITC determination. An exporter is classied as exiting the U.S. market upon
a¢ rmative preliminary (nal) ITC determination if it does not export any
of the a¤ected HS-6 digit products after the a¢ rmative preliminary (nal)
ITC determination (denoted as Exit). Meanwhile, we construct a dummy
variable called Trade Intermediary, which takes value of 1 if the exporter
is a trade intermediary and 0 otherwise. The regression specication is as
follows:
Exitfp =   Trade Intermediaryfp + p + "fp: (9)
As shown in Columns 1 and 4 of Table 3, Trade Intermediary has negative
and statistically signicant estimated coe¢ cients, suggesting that trade in-
termediaries are less likely to exit the U.S. market of the a¤ected products
than direct exporters upon both the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determina-
tion and the a¢ rmative nal ITC determination. These results are robust
to the control for rm e¢ ciency (proxied by either export volume of the af-
fected products in Columns 2 and 5, or export price of the a¤ected products
in Columns 3 and 6). Meanwhile, it is interesting to observe that rms with
larger quantity of export volume or lower prices are less likely to exit, con-
sistent with the ndings in the literature on rm heterogeneity (e.g., Melitz,
2003).
In Table 4, we examine the relative likelihood of exit from the U.S. market
of the a¤ected products between single-product and multi-product direct
exporters upon both the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determination and the
a¢ rmative nal ITC determination. We construct an alternative dummy
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variable called Single Product, which takes value of 1 if the direct exporter
is a single-product direct exporter and 0 otherwise, and then regress the
outcome variable Exit on Single Product along with a list of HS-6 digit
product dummy, i.e.,
Exitfp =   Single Productfp + p + "fp: (10)
Columns 1-3 of Table 4 report the results regarding the likelihood of exit
upon the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determination. It is found that Single
Product has a negative and statistically signicant estimated coe¢ cient, re-
gardless of the control for rm e¢ ciency. Interestingly, however, the esti-
mated coe¢ cients of Single Product become positive and statistically sig-
nicant when we examine the likelihood of exit upon the a¢ rmative nal ITC
determination (Columns 4-6 of Table 4). Together, our results suggest that
single-product direct exporters are less likely to exit the U.S. market of the
a¤ected products than multi-product direct exporters upon the a¢ rmative
preliminary ITC determination, but the opposite holds upon the a¢ rmative
nal ITC determination.
5.4 Price Response
We now proceed to the analysis of possible e¤ects of antidumping investiga-
tion on export prices (i.e., F.O.B. prices charged by Chinese exporters), rst
at product level and then rm-product level.
Figures 5a-5d present time trends of export prices of a¤ected HS-6 digit
products and their control groups over the pre- and post-antidumping in-
vestigation periods. Interestingly, there is no clear di¤erential time trend
of export prices between the treatment and control groups both before and
after the antidumping investigation. Figures 5b and 5d clearly show that the
di¤erence in export prices between the treatment and control group is quite
at throughout the whole period despite some uctuations.
Figures 6a-6d present time trends of export prices of a¤ected products
of surviving rms and those of their control groups over the pre- and post-
antidumping investigation periods. Still, we nd no clear di¤erential time
trend of export prices between the treatment and control groups both before
and after the antidumping investigation. Moreover, Figures 6b and 6d clearly
demonstrate little di¤erence in export prices of a¤ected products of surviving
rms and those of their control groups throughout the whole period despite
some uctuations.
Regression results regarding the e¤ects of antidumping investigation on
export prices are reported in Table 5, with Columns 1-2 for the product level
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analysis and Columns 3-4 for the rm-product level analysis. It is found that,
with only one exception (the impact of nal ITC determination in product-
level analysis involving Control Group 2, which is signicant at 5% level),
there is no signicant e¤ect of the antidumping investigation on export prices
at both product and rm-product levels, consistent with the results revealed
in Figures 5a-5d and 6a-6d.
5.5 Robustness Checks
In this Section, we conduct a series of robustness checks on the aforemen-
tioned DID estimation for all the relevant outcome variables examined in
the Section 5.1-5.4 (i.e., logarithm of export volume at the HS-6 digit prod-
uct level, the logarithm of the number of exporters, the logarithm of export
volume per exporters for all exporters, the logarithm of export volume of
surviving exporters, the logarithm of export price at the HS-6 digit product
level, and the logarithm of export price of surviving exporters).
First, the validity of our DID estimation hinges upon the assumption
that the treatment and control groups are comparable before the treatment
happens. To explicitly check whether there is any di¤erence in time trends
between the treatment and control groups before the initiation of antidump-
ing investigation, we conduct a robustness check according to equation (7).
Estimation results are summarized in Table A.3 of the Appendix. Clearly,
there is no evidence for any di¤erential time trends between the treatment
and control groups before the initiation of antidumping investigation, hence
implying the validity of our DID estimations. Meanwhile, our main ndings
on the e¤ects of antidumping investigation remain robust.
Second, one may be concerned that products in the treatment group and
their counterparts in the control group may follow di¤erent time trends. To
address this concern, we allow for product-specic time trend in our estima-
tion, i.e., equation (8). Estimation results are reported in Table A.4 of the
Appendix. Clearly, our main ndings on the e¤ects of antidumping investiga-
tion remain robust to the inclusion of product-specic time trend, implying
the validity of our DID estimations.
Third, to alleviate the concern that our monthly data could be noisy
as not all exporters have export to the U.S. in every month, we conduct a
robustness check by using quarterly instead of monthly data (i.e., aggregation
of monthly export transactions to the quarterly level). Regression results
are reported in Table A.5 of the Appendix. It is found that, on top of
the statistically signicant impacts of antidumping investigations reported
earlier, the nal ITC determination has a negative and signicant (at 5%
level) impact on the export volume of surviving exporters (i.e., some limited
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evidence for the intensive margin e¤ect). In addition, the magnitudes of the
e¤ects for the sample of quarterly data are much bigger.
Fourth, to further address the concern that our results may be a¤ected
by some outlying observations, we focus on a sub-sample without the top
and bottom 1% observations. Regression results reported in Table A.6 of
the Appendix show the robustness of our earlier ndings, and o¤er limited
evidence for the intensive margin e¤ect.
Fifth, note that in Sections 5.1-5.4, we only include successful antidump-
ing cases (i.e., 28 cases with a¢ rmative preliminary and a¢ rmative nal ITC
determinations out of 42 antidumping cases), partly because we would like
to investigate the di¤erential impacts of the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC de-
termination and the a¢ rmative nal ITC determination. To check whether
our main results are sensitive to the selection of the antidumping cases, we
conduct a robustness check by including the 5 unsuccessful cases and 1 with-
drawn case. Regression results are reported in Table A.7 of the Appendix.
It is found that our main results regarding the e¤ects of antidumping inves-
tigation remain the same as reported earlier.7
Sixth, it is possible that other countries may conduct the antidumping in-
vestigation of the same products as the U.S. during the same period, thereby
confounding the e¤ects of the U.S. antidumping investigation on Chinese ex-
porters and complicating the interpretation of our results. To address this
concern, we conduct a robustness check by excluding such overlapping an-
tidumping cases (i.e., 4 cases). Regression results are reported in Table A.8 of
the Appendix. Clearly, our main ndings remain robust to this sub-sample.
5.6 Discussion
In the previous sections, we have uncovered how exporters respond to an-
tidumping investigation. The main ndings can be summarized as:
 substantial trade-dampening e¤ects of antidumping investigations at
HS-6 digit product level
 a sharp decrease in the number of exporters but little change in the
export volume per exporter
 direct exporters more likely to exit the U.S. market than trade inter-
mediaries
7It is noted that the impact of the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determination has
relatively bigger impact than that obtained using the original sample of 28 successful
cases, presumably because the negative impact of the a¢ rmative nal ITC determination
for the ve unsuccessful cases should be smaller than that for the 28 successful cases.
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 multi-product direct exporters more likely to exit the U.S. market than
single-product direct exporters upon the a¢ rmative preliminary ITC
determination, but the opposite holds upon the a¢ rmative nal ITC
determination
 little adjustment in the F.O.B. export prices to antidumping investiga-
tions at both the HS-6 digit product level and rm-product level
In what follows, drawing on recent developments in trade literature, we
o¤er a coherent explanation to the above empirical ndings.
The nding of little change in F.O.B. export prices is understandable in
the setup of U.S. antidumping investigation against Chinese exporters. On
the one hand, it is not rational for Chinese exporters to lower the F.O.B.
export prices, as that would exacerbate their position in the antidumping
investigations. On the other hand, Chinese exporters may not have any bar-
gaining power vis-à-vis their U.S. importers to increase their F.O.B. export
prices, as they are generally fragmented and tend to concentrate in low-value-
added manufacturing.
Given the little change in the F.O.B. export prices, it is expected that
the nal sales prices of the concerned export products in the U.S. market
would generally increase, due to the imposition of antidumping duties and
some pass-through by U.S. importers or retailers. The increase in the nal
sales prices in the U.S. market subsequently leads to a decline in the demand
of the concerned products, which explains the observed substantial trade-
dampening e¤ects of antidumping investigations at the product level.
At the status quo, the shrinking market demand would lead to a decrease
in rm revenue across the board. In a world with constant markups and
product-specic xed costs of exporting (i.e., Melitz, 2003), some less pro-
ductive rms may nd their revenues not large enough to cover the xed
costs and hence exit the U.S. market. In a world with variable markups
(even without xed costs of exporting, e.g., Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008),
rms would encounter a decrease in their markups, as a result of which some
less productive rms incur losses and hence exit the U.S. market. Under
the new equilibrium, however, due to the exit of less productive exporters
from the U.S. market, it is possible that the surviving (and the more pro-
ductive) exporters could maintain their export volume by absorbing some of
the market share left over by the exiting exporters.
The decrease in rm revenues may cast di¤erent pressures on di¤erent
types of exporters in their likelihood of exit. For example, we observe that
trade intermediaries are less likely to exit the U.S. market following an-
tidumping investigations than direct exporters. This can be explained in a
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model of exporting behavior in the presence of trade intermediaries. Specif-
ically, Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) and Lu, Lu, and Tao (2011) show
that the more productive manufacturers choose to export directly by them-
selves (these manufacturers are referred to as direct exporters), whereas the
less productive manufacturers choose to export through trade intermediaries
(these manufacturers are referred to as indirect exporters). The decrease in
rm revenues due to antidumping investigations causes some (less produc-
tive) indirect exporters to exit the U.S. market, and at the same time makes
some (less productive) direct exporters switch to export through trade in-
termediaries. As a result, the number of trade intermediaries may change
relatively smaller than that of direct exporters, as trade intermediaries lose
some old clients but also gain some new ones.
We also observe that multi-product direct exporters more likely to exit
the U.S. market than single-product direct exporters upon the a¢ rmative
preliminary ITC determination, but the opposite holds upon the a¢ rmative
nal ITC determination. One possible explanation lies in the ease of re-
source reallocation among di¤erent products within the multi-product direct
exporters relative to their single-product counterparts (e.g., Mayer, Melitz
and Ottaviano, 2011). Specically, due to the scope economies (e.g., some
market-specic xed costs of exporting regardless of the number of exported
products), the productivity threshold of direct exporting for multi-product
direct exporters is lower than that for single-product direct exporters. This
is consistent with the fact that much more multi-product direct exporters are
observed in the sample than single-product direct exporters.
The a¢ rmative preliminary ITC determination generates negative shocks
on both single-product and multi-product direct exporters, by reducing their
revenues generated from the a¤ected product category. However, such nega-
tive impact is stronger for multi-product direct exporters than their single-
product counterparts, consequently leading to more exit of the former relative
to the latter from the U.S. market of the a¤ected products. This is because in
response to the decrease in revenues generated from the a¤ected product cat-
egory, multi-product direct exporters would reallocate their resources away
from the a¤ected products to their existing, una¤ected products (especially
when the a¤ected products are not their core products). As a result, these
multi-product direct exporters earn less revenue from the a¤ected products
than their ex ante equally protable single-product counterparts. Further-
more, in a world with constant markups but some product-specic xed costs
of exporting, such resource reallocation makes multi-product direct exporters
less likely to break even in the and hence more likely to exit the U.S. market
of the a¤ected products. In a world with variable markups, the further re-
duction in revenues due to the resource reallocation further lowers markups
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of multi-product direct exporters, causing losses in the and hence exit from
the U.S. market of the a¤ected products.
Upon the a¢ rmative nal ITC determination, there will be a second
wave of negative shocks on both single-product and multi-product direct
exporters. However, given that the remaining multi-product direct exporters
are those having limited room for resource reallocation away from the a¤ected
products (e.g., the a¤ected products are their core products), such negative
shocks are expected to cast similar impacts on both single-product and multi-
product direct exporters. As the productivity threshold of direct exporting
for the remaining multi-product direct exporters is lower than that of single-
product direct exporters, negative shocks of the similar magnitude cause
a disproportionally more exit of the latter than the former from the U.S.
market.
6 Conclusion
Antidumping measures have become a popular tool for governments to pro-
tect their domestic rms and industries. Much insight has been gained from
a large and growing literature on how e¤ective the antidumping measures
are in trade protection. An equally important but overlooked issue is how
antidumping measures a¤ect the behavior of foreign exporters, the under-
standing of which should help us gain a complete picture of the e¤ectiveness
of the antidumping measures.
In this paper, we use China Customs data to investigate how Chinese
exporters respond to U.S. antidumping investigations of their products during
the 2000-2006 period. To identify the e¤ects of antidumping investigation, we
use the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation, i.e., the comparison of outcome
variables of exporters in the a¤ected product category with those in the
una¤ected product category before and after the various important stages
of the antidumping investigation process. We nd that much of the trade-
dampening e¤ect of antidumping investigations at product level operates
through the extensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the number of exporters)
rather than the intensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the export volume per
exporter). We also nd that the decrease in the number of exporters is
contributed by direct exporters as opposed to trade intermediaries, and by
rst multi-product direct exporters (i.e., upon the a¢ rmative preliminary
ITC determination) and then their single-product counterparts (i.e., upon
the a¢ rmative nal ITC determination). Moreover, we detect little price
adjustments to antidumping investigations at both the product level and
rm-product level. Finally, drawing recent developments in trade theories,
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we o¤er a coherent explanation to our empirical ndings on how exporters
respond to antidumping investigations.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on antidumping by exam-
ining the e¤ect of antidumping measures on the a¤ected rms rather than the
protected rms. Meanwhile, it provides further evidence regarding export-
ing behavior across di¤erent types of rms, i.e., trade intermediaries versus
direct exporters, and single- versus multi-product exporters. It also com-
plements the literature on trade liberalization by documenting the resource
reallocation across rms and across products within rms in response to the
negative shocks in the trade environment.
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Figure 1: Time trends of export volume, product level 
Figure 1a (Control group 1)                                                                                                                Figure 1b (Control group 1) 
               
Figure 1c (Control group 2)                                                                                                                      Figure 1d (Control group 2) 
             
Note: The upper panel reports the results obtained using control group 1, whereas the lower panel reports the results obtained using control group 2. The left panel reports time 
trends of the treatment and control groups separately, whereas the right panel reports the time trend of the difference between the treatment and control groups. The three 
references lines mark respectively the date points of initiation of the antidumping investigation, the preliminary and final ITC determination. 
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Figure 2: Time trends of the number of exporters 
Figure 2a (Control group 1)                                                                                     Figure 2b (Control group 1) 
           
Figure 2c (Control group 2)                                                                                     Figure 2d (Control group 2) 
           
Note: The upper panel reports the results obtained using control group 1, whereas the lower panel reports the results obtained using control group 2. The left panel reports time 
trends of the treatment and control groups separately, whereas the right panel reports the time trend of the difference between the treatment and control groups. The three 
references lines mark respectively the date points of initiation of the antidumping investigation, the preliminary and final ITC determination. 
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Figure 3: Time trends of export volume per exporter, all exporters 
Figure 3a (Control group 1)                                                                                     Figure 3b (Control group 1) 
              
Figure 3c (Control group 2)                                                                                     Figure 3d (Control group 2) 
                                
Note: The upper panel reports the results obtained using control group 1, whereas the lower panel reports the results obtained using control group 2. The left panel reports time 
trends of the treatment and control groups separately, whereas the right panel reports the time trend of the difference between the treatment and control groups. . The three 
references lines mark respectively the date points of initiation of the antidumping investigation, the preliminary and final ITC determination. 
-1
-.
5
0
.5
1
-10 0 10 20
month
treatment group control group
-1
.5
-1
-.
5
0
ex
po
rt
 v
ol
um
e 
pe
r 
ex
po
rt
er
-10 0 10 20
month
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
-10 0 10 20
month
treatment group control group
-1
.5
-1
-.5
0
ex
po
rt 
vo
lu
m
e 
pe
r e
xp
or
te
r
-10 0 10 20
month
Figure 4: Time trends of export volume, surviving exporters 
Figure 4a (Control group 1)                                                                                     Figure 4b (Control group 1) 
           
Figure 4c (Control group 2)                                                                                     Figure 4d (Control group 2) 
           
Note: The upper panel reports the results obtained using control group 1, whereas the lower panel reports the results obtained using control group 2. The left panel reports time 
trends of the treatment and control groups separately, whereas the right panel reports the time trend of the difference between the treatment and control groups. The three 
references lines mark respectively the date points of initiation of the antidumping investigation, the preliminary and final ITC determination. 
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Figure 5: Time trends of export prices, product level 
Figure 5a (Control group 1)                                                                                     Figure 5b (Control group 1) 
            
Figure 5c (Control group 2)                                                                                     Figure 5d (Control group 2) 
            
Note: The upper panel reports the results obtained using control group 1, whereas the lower panel reports the results obtained using control group 2. The left panel reports time 
trends of the treatment and control groups separately, whereas the right panel reports the time trend of the difference between the treatment and control groups. The three 
references lines mark respectively the date points of initiation of the antidumping investigation, the preliminary and final ITC determination. 
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Figure 6: Time trends of export prices, surviving exporters 
Figure 6a (Control group 1)                                                                                     Figure 6b (Control group 1) 
            
Figure 6c (Control group 2)                                                                                     Figure 6d (Control group 2) 
            
Note: The upper panel reports the results obtained using control group 1, whereas the lower panel reports the results obtained using control group 2. The left panel reports time 
trends of the treatment and control groups separately, whereas the right panel reports the time trend of the difference between the treatment and control groups. . The three 
references lines mark respectively the date points of initiation of the antidumping investigation, the preliminary and final ITC determination. 
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Table 1: The effect of antidumping investigation on export volume, product level 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Log (export volume)     
Control group  1 2 
Initiation (β1) -0.108  -0.135  
 
(0.164)  (0.163)  
Preliminary ITC determination (β2) -0.430**  -0.450**  
 
(0.112)  (0.112)  
Final ITC determination (β3) -1.081**  -1.115**  
 
(0.193)  (0.195)  
Month fixed effects yes  yes  
Product fixed effects yes  yes  
Number of observations 16,294  14,993  
R-squared 0.759  0.744  
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in the bracket. ** represents 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The effect of antidumping investigation, extensive versus intensive margins 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
 
 
 
     
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in the bracket. * and ** represent statistical significance at the %% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
                  
 
     (1)                       (2) (3)                 (4) (5) (6) 
Specification Extensive margin Intensive margin  
Dependent Variable Log (number of exporters)  Log (export volume per exporter) 
Sample Whole sample Whole sample Surviving firms 
Control Group 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Initiation (β1) -0.067  -0.076  -0.041 -0.060 0.026 0.025 
 
(0.042)  (0.042)  (0.146) (0.145) (0.050) (0.050) 
Preliminary ITC determination (β2) -0.228**  -0.235**  -0.198* -0.212* -0.034 -0.036 
 
(0.056)  (0.057)  (0.090) (0.090) (0.035) (0.035) 
Final ITC determination (β3) -0.402**  -0.417**  -0.671** -0.693** -0.097 -0.101 
 
(0.090)  (0.091)  (0.149) (0.149) (0.052) (0.051) 
Month fixed effects yes  yes  yes yes yes yes 
Product fixed effects yes  yes  yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 16,302  14,997  16,302 14,997 547,007 538,113 
R-squared 0.932  0.936  0.659 0.665 0.227 0.226 
 Table 3: The effect of antidumping investigation on the likelihood of exit, trade intermediaries versus direct 
exporters 
 
 (1)                  (2)                  (3) (4)                (5)                (6) 
Dependent Variable Exit 
Cutoff point Preliminary ITC determination Final ITC determination 
Trade intermediaries -0.091** -0.116** -0.091** -0.085** -0.099** -0.083** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Log (export volume)                        -0.069**  
   -0.029**  
 
 
(0.002) 
 
 (0.002)  
Log (export price)   
 0.048**    -0.032** 
 
  
(0.007)   (0.007) 
Month fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Product fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 212,046 211,867 211,867 202,389 202,322 202,322 
Pseudo R2 0.300 0.308 0.300 0.224 0.226 0.224 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in the bracket. ** represents statistical significance at the 1% 
level. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: The effect of antidumping investigation on the likelihood of exit, single-product direct exporters versus 
multiple-product direct exporters 
 
 (1)                  (2)                  (3) (4)                (5)                (6) 
Dependent Variable Exit 
Cutoff point Preliminary ITC determination Final ITC determination 
Single-product firm -0.820** -0.763** -0.815** 0.649** 0.693** 0.646** 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Log (export volume)                        -0.077**  
   -0.049**  
 
 
(0.003) 
 
 (0.003)  
Log (export price)   
 0.085**    -0.026** 
 
  
(0.008)   (0.009) 
Month fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Product fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 131,979 131,871 131,871 124,391 124,298 124,298 
Pseudo R2 0.315 0.325 0.317 0.280 0.285 0.280 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in the bracket. ** represents statistical significance at the 1% 
level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5: The effect of antidumping investigation on export prices 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                
 
 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in the bracket. * represents statistical significance 
at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Specification Product Level  Surviving Exporters 
Dependent Variable Log (export price) 
Control Group 1 2 1 2 
Initiation (β1) 0.006    0.021  -0.017 -0.017 
 
(0.034)    (0.033)  (0.019) (0.019) 
Preliminary ITC determination (β2) -0.011   0.001  0.011 0.012 
 
(0.035)    (0.036)  (0.015) (0.015) 
Final ITC determination (β3) 0.105    0.119*  0.047 0.049 
 
(0.055)   (0.057)  (0.034) (0.034) 
Month fixed effects yes  yes  yes yes 
Product fixed effects yes  yes  yes yes 
Number of observations 16,294  14,993  547,007 538,113 
R-squared 0.839  0.847  0.612 0.613 
                      
 
Table A.1: Logit regression on the likelihood of being investigated for dumping 
 (1) 
Dependent Variable Probability of being investigated for dumping 
Import value  0.473** 
 (0.036) 
Real GDP growth rate 0.031 
 (0.047) 
Exchange rate index(1989=100) 1.598** 
 (0.602) 
Previously investigated  0.749** 
 (0.205) 
Industry fixed effect yes 
Number of observations  2,243 
Pseudo R2  0.230 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in the bracket. ** represents statistical significance 
at the 1% level. 
. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A.2: US antidumping cases against China over 2000-2006 
CASE_ID PRODUCT 
Initiation 
date 
Preliminary ITC Final ITC 
Date Decision Date 
Decisio
n 
USA-AD-868 Steel Wire Rope 03/2000 04/2000 A 04/2001 N 
USA-AD-874 Steel Concrete Rebar 07/2000 08/2000 A 07/2001 A 
USA-AD-885 Desktop Note Counters and Scanners 07/2000 09/2000 N . . 
USA-AD-891 Foundry Coke 09/2000 11/2000 A 09/2001 A 
USA-AD-893 Honey 10/2000 11/2000 A 11/2001 A 
USA-AD-895 Pure Magnesium 10/2000 12/2000 A 11/2001 A 
USA-AD-899 Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Products 11/2000 01/2001 A 11/2001 A 
USA-AD-921 Folding Gift Boxes 03/2001 04/2001 A 12/2001 A 
USA-AD-922 Automotive Replacement Glass Windshields 03/2001 04/2001 A 04/2002 A 
USA-AD-932 Folding Metal Tables and Chairs 05/2001 06/2001 A 06/2002 A 
USA-AD-935 Structural Steel Beams 06/2001 07/2001 A 06/2002 N 
USA-AD-943 Circular-Welded Non-Alloy Steel Pipe 06/2001 07/2001 A 07/2002 N 
USA-AD-951 Blast Furnace Coke 07/2001 08/2001 N . . 
USA-AD-968 Cold-Rolled Steel Products 10/2001 10/2001 A 11/2002 N 
USA-AD-986 Ferrovanadium 11/2001 01/2002 A 01/2003 A 
USA-AD-989 Ball Bearings 02/2002 05/2002 A 04/2003 N 
USA-AD-990 Non-Malleable Cast Iron Pipe Fittings 02/2002 04/2002 A 04/2003 A 
USA-AD-994 Oil Country Tubular Goods 04/2002 05/2002 N . . 
USA-AD-1010 Lawn and Garden Steel Fence Posts 05/2002 06/2002 A 06/2003 A 
USA-AD-1013 Saccharin 07/2002 08/2002 A 06/2003 A 
USA-AD-1014 Polyvinyl Alcohol 09/2002 10/2002 A 10/2003 A 
USA-AD-1020 Barium Carbonate 10/2002 11/2002 A 10/2003 A 
USA-AD-1021 Malleable Iron Pipe Fittings 11/2002 12/2002 A 12/2003 A 
USA-AD-1022 Refined Brown Aluminum Oxide 11/2002 01/2003 A 11/2003 A 
USA-AD-1030 44'-Diamino-22'-Stilbenedisulfonic Acid and Stilbenic 
Fluorescent Whitening Agents 
04/2003 . W . . 
USA-AD-1034 Color Television Receivers 05/2003 06/2003 A 06/2004 A 
USA-AD-1036 44'-Diamino-22'-Stilbenedisulfonic Acid Chemistry 05/2003 07/2003 N . . 
USA-AD-1043 Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags 06/2003 08/2003 A 08/2004 A 
USA-AD-1046 Tetrahydrofurfuryl Alcohol 06/2003 08/2003 A 08/2004 A 
USA-AD-1047 Ironing Tables and Certain Parts Thereof 07/2003 08/2003 A 08/2004 A 
USA-AD-1049 Electrolytic Manganese Dioxide 08/2003 . T . . 
USA-AD-1058 Wooden Bedroom Furniture 11/2003 01/2004 A 12/2004 A 
USA-AD-1059 Hand Trucks 11/2003 01/2004 A 12/2004 A 
USA-AD-1060 Carbazole Violet Pigment 23 11/2003 01/2004 A 12/2004 A 
USA-AD-1064 Certain Frozen and Canned Warmwater Shrimp and Prawns 01/2004 03/2004 A 01/2005 P 
USA-AD-1070a Crepe Paper Products 02/2004 04/2004 A 01/2005 A 
USA-AD-1070b Certain Tissue Paper Products  02/2004 04/2004 A 03/2005 A 
USA-AD-1071 Magnesium 03/2004 05/2004 A 04/2005 A 
USA-AD-1073 Certain Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe 03/2004 05/2004 A . T 
USA-AD-1082 Chlorinated Isocyanurates 05/2004 07/2004 A 06/2005 A 
USA-AD-1091 Artists' Canvas 04/2005 05/2005 A 05/2006 A 
USA-AD-1092 Diamond Sawblades and Parts Thereof 05/2005 07/2005 A 07/006 N 
USA-AD-1095 Certain Lined Paper Products 09/2005 10/2005 A 09/2006 A 
USA-AD-1099 Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod 11/2005 01/2006 N . . 
USA-AD-1102 Activated Carbon 02/2006 . W . . 
USA-AD-1103 Certain Activated Carbon 03/2006 05/2006 A 04/2007 A 
USA-AD-1104 Certain Polyester Staple Fiber 06/2006 08/2006 A 05/2007 A 
USA-AD-1107 Coated Free Sheet Paper 11/2006 12/2006 A 12/2007 N 
Note: A: affirmative; B: negative; W: withdrawal; T: terminated  
 Table A.3: Robustness check, differential time trends before the antidumping investigation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)   (11)   (12) 
Specification  Product Level Extensive margin Intensive margin    Product Level Surviving exporters 
Dependent Variable Log (export volume) Log (number of exporters) Log (export volume per exporter)      Log(export rice)    Log(export price) 
Sample Whole sample Whole sample Whole sample Surviving firms Whole sample  Surviving firms 
Control Group 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Previous 12 months (β0) -0.005 -0.023 -0.008 -0.015 0.011 -0.002 0.041 0.039 0.008 0.022      0.002 0.004 
 (0.135) (0.134) (0.047) (0.047) (0.104) (0.103) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.036) (0.018) (0.018) 
Initiation (β1) -0.111 -0.146 -0.071 -0.084 -0.036 -0.061 0.050 0.047 0.010 0.031 -0.016 -0.014 
 (0.193) (0.192) (0.055) (0.055) (0.167) (0.165) (0.055) (0.055) (0.045) (0.046) (0.024) (0.025) 
Preliminary ITC determination 
(β2) 
-0.432** -0.461** -0.232** -0.243** -0.193 -0.212 -0.009 -0.013 -0.008 0.012 0.013 0.015 
 (0.148) (0.147) (0.064) (0.064) (0.120) (0.119) (0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047) (0.021) (0.022) 
Final ITC determination (β3) -1.083** -1.126** -0.406** -0.424** -0.665** -0.694** -0.070 -0.076 0.108 0.130 0.048 0.051 
 (0.217) (0.218) (0.096) (0.097) (0.169) (0.169) (0.061) (0.061) (0.065) (0.068) (0.037) (0.038) 
Month dummy  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Product dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 16,294 14,993 16,302 14,993 16,302 14,997 547,007 538,113 16,294 14,993 547,007 538,113 
R-squared 0.759 0.762 0.932 0.936 0.659 0.665 0.227 0.226 0.839 0.847 0.612 0.613 
  Note: Standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in the bracket. ** represents statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
  
Table A.4: Robustness check, inclusion of product-specific time trends 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Specification Product Level Extensive margin Intensive margin  Product Level Surviving exporters 
Dependent Variable Log (export volume) Log (number of exporters) Log (export volume per exporter) Log(export price) Log(export price) 
Sample Whole sample Whole sample Whole sample Surviving firms Whole sample Surviving firms 
Control Group 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Initiation (β1) -0.129 -0.134 -0.071 -0.075 -0.063 -0.064 0.002 0.003 0.015 0.022 -0.034* -0.034* 
 (0.149) (0.148) (0.042) (0.042) (0.126) (0.126) (0.052) (0.052) (0.030) (0.030) (0.017) (0.017) 
Preliminary ITC determination (β2) -0.363** -0.357** -0.215** -0.216** -0.148 -0.142 -0.067 -0.067 -0.011 -0.008 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.067) (0.066) (0.100) (0.100) (0.049) (0.049) (0.038) (0.039) (0.015) (0.015) 
Final ITC determination (β3) -0.903** -0.888** -0.357** -0.354** -0.547** -0.535** -0.124 -0.125 0.058 0.059 0.002 0.003 
 (0.221) (0.220) (0.110) (0.109) (0.158) (0.158) (0.070) (0.070) (0.067) (0.067) (0.024) (0.024) 
Month dummy  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Product dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Product time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 16,294 14,993 16,302 14,997 16,302 14,997 547,007 538,113 16,294 14,993 547,007 538,113 
R-squared 0.796 0.762 0.944 0.947 0.706 0.710 0.229 0.228 0.856 0.862 0.613 0.615 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in the bracket. * and ** represent statistical significance at the 5% level and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  
  
Table A.5: Robustness check, quarterly data 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Specification Product Level Extensive margin Intensive margin  Product Level Surviving exporters 
Dependent Variable Log (export volume) Log (number of exporters) Log (export volume per exporter) Log(export price) Log(export price) 
Sample  Whole sample Whole sample Whole sample Surviving firms Whole sample Surviving firms 
Control Group 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Initiation (β1) 0.113 0.086 -0.056 -0.064 0.221 0.204 0.065 0.064 -0.035 -0.022 -0.020 -0.019 
 (0.273) (0.272) (0.043) (0.043) (0.266) (0.264) (0.055) (0.056) (0.073) (0.073) (0.021) (0.021) 
Preliminary ITC determination (β2) -0.735** -0.751** -0.177** -0.184** -0.490** -0.499** -0.047 -0.049 0.026 0.036 0.007 0.008 
 (0.155) (0.156) (0.054) (0.054) (0.135) (0.135) (0.045) (0.045) (0.035) (0.036) (0.012) (0.013) 
Final ITC determination (β3) -1.409** -1.442** -0.279** -0.295** -1.018** -1.035** -0.128* -0.132* 0.068 0.081 0.020 0.021 
 (0.229) (0.232) (0.076) (0.076) (0.191) (0.193) (0.056) (0.057) (0.044) (0.046) (0.031) (0.031) 
Month dummy  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Product dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 6,314 5,736 6,314 5,376 6,314 5,736 312,311 306,445 6,310 5,736 311,702 305,858 
R-squared 0.781 0.785 0.957 0.959 0.672 0.677 0.202 0.202 0.854 0.862 0.591 0.593 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in the bracket. * and ** represent statistical significance at the 5% level and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  
Table A.6: Robustness check, exclusion of outliers 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Specification Product Level Extensive margin Intensive margin  Product Level Surviving exporters 
Dependent Variable Log (export volume) Log (number of exporters) Log (export volume per exporter) Log(export price) Log(export price) 
Sample Whole sample  Whole sample Whole sample Surviving firms Whole sample Surviving firms 
Control Group 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Initiation (β1) -0.071 -0.093 -0.060 -0.070 -0.012 -0.024 0.020 0.020 0.011 0.026 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.169) (0.168) (0.043) (0.043) (0.151) (0.150) (0.043) (0.043) (0.033) (0.033) (0.018) (0.019) 
Preliminary ITC determination (β2) -0.438** -0.459** -0.230** -0.237** -0.205* -0.218* -0.035 -0.036 -0.005 0.008 0.014 0.015 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.057) (0.057) (0.089) (0.088) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.035) (0.013) (0.013) 
Final ITC determination (β3) -1.074** -1.111** -0.397** -0.412** -0.671** -0.693** -0.101* -0.104* 0.106 0.123* 0.043 0.044 
 (0.192) (0.193) (0.091) (0.091) (0.146) (0.147) (0.047) (0.047) (0.054) (0.057) (0.031) (0.032) 
Month dummy  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Product dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 15,827 14,595 15,834 14,599 15,834 14,599 531,400 522,784 15,827 14,595 531,400 522,784 
R-squared 0.774 0.776 0.934 0.938 0.676 0.681 0.257 0.256 0.842 0.85 0.623 0.625 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in the bracket. * and ** represent statistical significance at the 5% level and 1% level, respectively.      
 
 
 
  
Table A.7: Robustness check, inclusion of unsuccessful and withdrawn cases 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Specification Product Level Extensive margin Intensive margin  Product Level Surviving exporters 
Dependent Variable Log (export volume) Log (number of exporters) Log (export volume per exporter) Log(export price) Log(export price) 
Sample Whole sample Whole sample Whole sample Surviving firms Whole sample Surviving firms 
Control Group 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Initiation (β1) -0.155 -0.179 -0.037 -0.045 -0.082 -0.097 0.010 0.011 -0.021 -0.022 -0.021 -0.022 
 (0.115) (0.114) (0.026) (0.026) (0.100) (0.100) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.015) (0.015) 
Preliminary ITC determination (β2) -0.373** -0.411** -0.132** -0.142** -0.205** -0.218** 0.022 0.022 0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.098) (0.100) (0.036) (0.037) (0.077) (0.077) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034) (0.017) (0.017) 
Final ITC determination (β3) -0.755** -0.798** -0.213** -0.238** -0.447** -0.473** 0.007 0.004 0.049 0.060 0.004 0.004 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.058) (0.058) (0.116) (0.117) (0.056) (0.057) (0.046) (0.048) (0.034) (0.034) 
Month dummy  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Product dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 22,821 20,373 22,823 20,373 22,823 20,373 909,293 884,678 22,813 20,369 906,737 882,169 
R-squared 0.781 0.769 0.950 0.953 0.660 0.670 0.205 0.205 0.843 0.846 0.531 0.532 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in the bracket. ** represents statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
Table A.8: Robustness check, exclusion of antidumping cases investigated by other countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Specification Product Level Extensive margin Intensive margin  Product Level Surviving exporters 
Dependent Variable Log (export volume) Log (number of exporters) Log (export volume per exporter) Log(export price) Log(export price) 
Sample Whole sample Whole sample Whole sample Surviving firms Whole sample Surviving firms 
Control Group 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Initiation (β1) -0.227 -0.263 -0.048 -0.059 -0.180 -0.204 0.025 0.024 0.034 0.046 -0.017 -0.016 
 (0.151) (0.150) (0.047) (0.047) (0.126) (0.125) (0.050) (0.050) (0.035) (0.035) (0.019) (0.020) 
Preliminary ITC determination (β2) -0.308** -0.325** -0.203*** -0.209** -0.103 -0.114 -0.031 -0.033 -0.001 0.007 0.011 0.012 
 (0.106) (0.107) (0.059) (0.059) (0.086) (0.086) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.015) (0.015) 
Final ITC determination (β3) -0.826** -0.863** -0.363*** -0.376** -0.457** -0.482** -0.092 -0.096 0.079 0.093 0.046 0.047 
 (0.177) (0.179) (0.095) (0.095) (0.136) (0.138) (0.052) (0.052) (0.056) (0.059) (0.034) (0.035) 
Month dummy  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Product dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 14,425 13,277 14,431 13,280 14,431 13,280 543,567 534,818 14,425 13,277 543,567 534,818 
R-squared 0.781 0.785 0.933 0.937 0.675 0.680 0.223 0.223 0.848 0.856 0.611 0.613 
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the product level, are reported in the bracket. ** represents statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
